In August 1931, Mahatma Gandhi set sail for England on a mission many believed was destined to fail before it even began. As the sole representative of the Indian National Congress at the Second Round Table Conference, Gandhi carried the hopes of millions demanding freedom from British colonial rule. Yet, what awaited him in London was not a genuine negotiation for Indian independence, but a carefully orchestrated gathering designed to fragment Indian voices and delay any meaningful transfer of power. The story of Gandhi at the Second Round Table Conference reveals both his remarkable resilience and the sophisticated mechanisms colonial powers used to maintain their grip on India.
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The voyage to London: a simple man on a grand mission
Gandhi departed for England in August 1931 following the Gandhi-Irwin Pact, a political agreement signed on 5 March 1931 that suspended the Civil Disobedience Movement in exchange for Congress participation in constitutional discussions. The pact had secured the release of over 90,000 political prisoners, though many felt its terms fell short of Gandhi’s original demands.
The voyage provided Gandhi with much-needed rest after months of intense political activity. He spent time reading, writing, and answering correspondence. When his right hand suffered from writer’s cramp, he simply switched to writing with his left hand. True to his philosophy of simplicity, Gandhi maintained his spartan lifestyle aboard the ship, adhering to his regular prayer routines and spinning sessions.
When asked about his earthly possessions, Gandhi famously remarked that they consisted merely of six spinning wheels, a can of goat’s milk, six homespun loincloths, and his reputation. Arriving in London on 12 September 1931, he was met by surging crowds despite the rain, requiring police intervention to manage the enthusiastic reception.
Choosing to live among the poor
The British government offered Gandhi accommodation at a luxury hotel in London’s West End. He refused. Instead, he accepted an invitation from Muriel Lester to stay at Kingsley Hall, a community centre serving the poor of London’s East End. This decision was deeply intentional-Gandhi wanted to live among working-class people rather than be isolated in the corridors of power.
Kingsley Hall was a Christian Socialist community centre established by sisters Muriel and Doris Lester in Bromley-by-Bow. Gandhi occupied a small cell-bedroom on the top floor, sleeping on the roof itself when weather permitted. For twelve weeks, he made this humble dwelling his home, exploring the surrounding neighbourhood on early morning walks often accompanied by local children who affectionately called him “Uncle Gandhi.”
His visitors at Kingsley Hall included an extraordinary mix of personalities: Charlie Chaplin, George Bernard Shaw, David Lloyd George, the Archbishop of Canterbury, and the Pearly King and Queen of East London. When Gandhi departed, he wrote in the visitor’s book a simple but profound message: “Love surrounded me here.” English Heritage later commemorated his stay with a blue plaque-the first in the scheme to honour an Indian figure.
A conference of divided interests
The Second Round Table Conference commenced on 12 September 1931 at St. James’s Palace, chaired by British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. Approximately 100 representatives from various political, religious, and social groups participated. But this apparent inclusivity masked a deliberate strategy to undermine any unified Indian position.
Gandhi attended as the sole official Congress representative, accompanied by advisers including Sarojini Naidu, Madan Mohan Malaviya, and industrialist G.D. Birla. However, the conference hall was filled with delegates carefully selected by the British government-princes from India’s numerous kingdoms, representatives of religious minorities, landlords, and business interests. Each group had been given separate representation, ensuring that no single voice could claim to speak for India as a whole.
The British strategy of division
The composition of the conference was no accident. Historians have pointed out that many delegates were conservative, government loyalists, and communalists, deliberately selected to neutralise Gandhi’s efforts. The colonial government’s strategy was transparent: get Gandhi to attend the conference and then neutralise him by surrounding him with delegates who would oppose any unified demand for independence.
Two weeks before the conference began, Britain’s political landscape had shifted dramatically. The Labour government had fallen, and MacDonald now headed a National Government dominated by the Conservative Party. Additionally, Britain was going off the Gold Standard during the conference, further distracting the government from Indian constitutional matters. The political climate in London had become considerably less sympathetic to Indian aspirations than it had been when the conference was first proposed.
The focus on minorities, not freedom
Gandhi quickly recognised that the conference had been structured to avoid the fundamental question of Indian independence. In his inaugural address, Prime Minister MacDonald made the British position clear: delegates must first devise a system of political representation that shared power equitably between different communities before any constitutional framework could be discussed. This approach placed communal issues at the centre while pushing the question of freedom to the margins.
Gandhi argued passionately that the Congress alone represented political India and that British rule itself perpetuated and exploited communal divisions. He insisted that the communal problem should not be allowed to block constitutional progress. But his pleas fell on deaf ears. The other delegates-Muslims, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and representatives of the Depressed Classes-had been encouraged by British officials to present separate demands.
The clash with Ambedkar
One of the most significant confrontations at the conference was between Gandhi and Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, representing the Depressed Classes (Dalits). Ambedkar demanded separate electorates for Dalits, treating them as a distinct political minority rather than as part of the Hindu community. Gandhi vehemently opposed this, arguing that such separation would permanently divide Hindu society and weaken the national movement.
The disagreement was profound. Gandhi was willing to guarantee legislative representation for Dalits but insisted on joint electorates that would keep them within the Hindu fold. Ambedkar, however, believed that only separate political power could protect Dalit interests against upper-caste domination. Following British encouragement, Ambedkar joined other minority representatives in signing the Minorities Pact, which demanded separate electorates for all signatory communities. This document covered approximately 46% of India’s population and effectively torpedoed any possibility of a unified Indian position.
Gandhi’s isolation
Gandhi found himself increasingly isolated. He had come hoping to negotiate the transfer of power from Britain to India. Instead, he spent weeks locked in debates about minority representation, weightage in legislatures, and separate electorates. The conference became exactly what the British had intended-a demonstration of Indian disunity that justified continued colonial rule.
Gandhi complained that the other delegates were merely nominees of the government rather than elected representatives of the Indian people. He argued that he could represent Muslims and Depressed Classes better than those who claimed to do so. But MacDonald dismissed these objections, countering that the Civil Disobedience Movement had only hindered British intentions toward India.
Returning empty-handed
As Gandhi had feared from the outset, the conference failed to reach any agreement on India’s constitutional future or communal representation. The session ended on 1 December 1931 with MacDonald announcing that since Indians could not agree among themselves, Britain would issue a Communal Award to settle minority representation-effectively reserving the right to determine India’s political structure unilaterally.
Gandhi departed Britain on 5 December 1931, leaving “without any disappointment” as he publicly stated, though carrying the knowledge that the conference had produced nothing concrete. He returned to India on 28 December 1931 to find that the political situation had deteriorated. Lord Irwin, with whom he had negotiated the pact, had been replaced by the less sympathetic Lord Willingdon.
The aftermath and renewed conflict
Within weeks of Gandhi’s return, the British government launched a fresh crackdown on the nationalist movement. Gandhi and other Congress leaders were arrested again, and the Congress was declared illegal. The government refused to concede the basic Indian demand for freedom based on immediate Dominion Status. In response, Gandhi relaunched the Civil Disobedience Movement, setting the stage for years of continued struggle.
The conference did have one lasting impact. The British Communal Award of 1932, which Gandhi bitterly opposed, led to his famous fast-unto-death against separate electorates for Dalits. This ultimately resulted in the Poona Pact between Gandhi and Ambedkar-a compromise that maintained joint electorates while reserving seats for Dalits in legislatures.
Though the Second Round Table Conference is often remembered as a failure, Gandhi’s biographer Robert Payne noted that by his mere presence, Gandhi had changed the attitude of the English people toward India. Wearing his characteristic dhoti, mobbed by enthusiastic crowds, visiting Lancashire cotton mills and meeting ordinary East Enders, Gandhi planted seeds of sympathy for Indian independence that would eventually bear fruit. The conference may have been a political failure, but Gandhi’s London sojourn was a triumph of moral leadership that resonated far beyond the negotiating table at St. James’s Palace.
What do you think? Was the Second Round Table Conference genuinely designed to find a constitutional settlement for India, or was it primarily a British strategy to expose and exploit Indian divisions? Could Gandhi have adopted a different approach to build consensus among the diverse Indian delegates?
References
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gandhi–Irwin_Pact
- https://www.english-heritage.org.uk/visit/blue-plaques/mahatma-gandhi-kingsley-hall/
- http://www.gandhismriti.gov.in/announcement/second-round-table-conference-london
- https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360206648_Gandhi_Ambedkar_and_British_Policy_at_the_Second_Round_Table_Conference_1931
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round_Table_Conferences_(India)
- https://www.britannica.com/event/Round-Table-Conference
- https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/southasia/2019/10/02/a-visit-from-gandhi/
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