In the early 1960s, Nagaland was gripped by violent conflict. Years of armed confrontation between Indian security forces and Naga insurgents had left communities devastated, families displaced, and a region trapped in cycles of violence. Into this desperate situation stepped three unlikely peacemakers who would attempt what seemed impossible: bringing sworn enemies to a negotiating table. Their story reveals both the promise and profound challenges of Gandhian mediation when confronting questions of sovereignty and self-determination.
Table of Contents
- How the Peace Mission came into being
- A Gandhian compromise that satisfied no one
- When words meant different things to different sides
- The practical difficulties of maintaining peace
- The breaking point for a Gandhian mediator
- The unraveling of the Peace Mission
- What the Peace Mission taught us about mediation
How the Peace Mission came into being
The violence had reached a breaking point. Following Nagaland’s designation as a separate state in 1963, hostilities only intensified. The newly formed state government appeared powerless to stop the bloodshed. Recognizing that neither military force nor political maneuvering could resolve the crisis, the Nagaland Baptist Church Council organized a convention in Wokha from January 31 to February 2, 1964, attended by approximately 5,000 representatives from all Naga ethnic groups.
The convention passed a historic resolution: both the Government of India and the underground Federal Government of Nagaland should negotiate through an independent Peace Mission. The Mission comprised three members: B.P. Chaliha, Chief Minister of Assam; Jaya Prakash Narayan, the renowned Sarvodaya leader; and Rev. Michael Scott, a British Anglican missionary known for his work on civil liberties.
These three men, all over 60 years old, traveled extensively across Nagaland’s difficult terrain, meeting underground leaders in remote hideouts, riding jeeps over rough roads, and trekking through monsoon rains. Their persistence paid off. On May 23, 1964, at Sakraba Village in Phek district, a ceasefire agreement was signed, though it was officially declared on September 6, 1964.
A Gandhian compromise that satisfied no one
After four years and five rounds of deliberation, the Peace Mission put forward what they believed was a balanced middle path. Their proposal urged both parties to soften their rigid positions on sovereignty and independence. The Mission suggested that Nagaland could join the Indian Union with distinct characteristics unlike other states.
The core of their proposal was voluntary participation. The Federal Government of Nagaland would participate in the Indian Union on their own volition, and both parties would mutually settle terms and conditions. The Government of India would adapt its relationship pattern to satisfy all sections of Naga opinion. This approach embodied classic Gandhian principles: conflicting parties should meet halfway through their own free choice, not through coercion.
When words meant different things to different sides
The proposal found no acceptance because each party interpreted it according to their existing positions. The Government of India welcomed the idea of the Naga Federal Government participating voluntarily, but understood this merely as providing greater autonomy to Nagaland within the existing constitutional framework.
The Naga Federal Government interpreted the same words completely differently. They wanted a plebiscite supervised by a neutral body where Nagas would decide their future according to their own volition. For them, voluntary participation implied the right to choose independence if they wished.
This fundamental gap exposed a deeper problem with the mediation approach. Can Gandhian principles of voluntary agreement work when parties fundamentally disagree on what those agreements mean? The Peace Mission found itself caught in the middle, unable to bridge interpretations that were worlds apart.
The practical difficulties of maintaining peace
Beyond philosophical differences, the Peace Mission faced constant practical challenges. Peace Observer teams investigated complaints about ceasefire violations from both sides. These teams included Gandhian peace workers like Marjorie Sykes and military representatives from each party.
However, the Mission had no enforcement power. Jaya Prakash Narayan acknowledged their helplessness, noting they worked merely as a post office without machinery to investigate complaints thoroughly. Meanwhile, the Naga Army continued moving about in villages with uniforms and arms, raising questions about what the ceasefire actually meant on the ground.
The breaking point for a Gandhian mediator
The situation deteriorated further in early 1965. Y.V. Gundevia, India’s Foreign Secretary, wrote to B.P. Chaliha welcoming the Peace Mission’s conclusion that a peaceful solution must be found within the Indian Union. This interpretation infuriated Jaya Prakash Narayan. He argued that the Government of India attached utterly wrong meaning to their proposals, destroying the principle of voluntary participation that was the heart of their work.
For Narayan, the phrase “continuing to remain within the Indian union” contradicted the very principle of self-determination. This was not merely a semantic dispute but struck at the core of what the mediation was trying to achieve. If one party could simply declare that all solutions must remain within predetermined boundaries, was genuine negotiation even possible?
Narayan became the first to resign from the Peace Mission in February 1966. The immediate trigger was when underground leaders protested against his alleged pronouncement that the Government of India could liquidate Naga rebels. Whether or not he made such a statement, the fact that underground leaders believed he did revealed a complete breakdown of trust.
For a devout Gandhian, nothing was more serious than loss of trust and credibility. Narayan made a difficult choice: it was immoral to remain in the Mission when he had lost confidence from those for whom it was established. He chose to continue with conflict rather than impose solutions on unwilling parties. This decision reflected a profound Gandhian principle: even well-intentioned mediation becomes violence when it forces outcomes that parties have not genuinely accepted.
The unraveling of the Peace Mission
Narayan’s resignation began the Mission’s collapse. Rev. Michael Scott was deported from India in May 1966, accused of anti-India activities, and all his papers were seized. B.P. Chaliha, despite his political connections, also faced the ire of his political bosses for his prominent role in the Mission.
For Narayan personally, his work in Nagaland came at great cost. He was publicly vilified by patriotic Indians who accused him of trying to divide India. Wherever he went, he was sneered at as anti-national. Many Indian authors who later wrote about Narayan’s life chose to ignore or minimize his three years in Nagaland, treating them as “lost years” rather than as a significant chapter in his life’s work.
What the Peace Mission taught us about mediation
The Nagaland Peace Mission revealed several hard truths about conflict mediation. First, good intentions and moral authority are not enough when fundamental interests are irreconcilable. The Mission members were respected, dedicated individuals who worked tirelessly for peace. Yet they could not overcome the basic reality that India would not accept independence for Nagaland, and significant numbers of Nagas would not accept anything less.
Second, the Gandhian emphasis on voluntary agreement faces severe limits when dealing with state sovereignty. States rarely view their territorial integrity as negotiable, no matter how much suffering results from maintaining it. The Indian government’s position that solutions must remain within the Indian Union was non-negotiable from the start, making true voluntary participation impossible.
Third, mediators without enforcement power can maintain ceasefires only as long as all parties see benefit in maintaining them. Once the ceasefire served its purpose for each side, violations became routine and the Peace Mission could only document them, not prevent them.
Finally, the Peace Mission showed that maintaining moral credibility with all sides may be impossible in deeply polarized conflicts. Narayan’s experience demonstrated that even a respected Gandhian leader could not simultaneously satisfy the Government of India, Naga insurgents, and Indian public opinion. His resignation acknowledged that sometimes the most principled choice is to admit failure rather than continue a mission that has lost legitimacy.
What do you think? Can Gandhian principles of voluntary agreement work in conflicts involving sovereignty and self-determination? When mediators lose the trust of one party, is resignation the only ethical option, or should they persist despite lost credibility?
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