Tehri Dam Project: Risks, Resistance, and Rehabilitation Challenges

The Tehri Dam stands as India’s tallest dam at 260.5 metres, yet its construction journey was marked by decades of fierce opposition, scientific debates, and unresolved humanitarian concerns. Built on the Bhagirathi River in Uttarakhand’s Garhwal district, this mega-project became a flashpoint for environmental activism, raising fundamental questions about development, displacement, and the constitutional right to life for millions living downstream.

Origins and geological concerns of the Tehri Dam 🔗

The idea of harnessing the Bhagirathi River’s energy emerged in the late 1940s, with preliminary investigations completed by 1961. The project received administrative clearance in 1976 and construction began in 1978, though significant delays would stretch completion to 2006. The dam’s design as one of the world’s largest rock-and-earth-filled embankment structures made it an ambitious engineering undertaking from the outset.

The project site’s location raised immediate red flags among geologists and seismologists. The dam sits in the Central Himalayan Seismic Gap, a major geologic fault zone where pressure has been accumulating for decades. Scientists warned that an earthquake of magnitude 8.0 or greater could occur in this region-potentially devastating for a structure holding back 3.54 cubic kilometres of water.

Vijay Paranjpye’s critical analysis 🔗

Economist Vijay Paranjpye conducted an extended cost-benefit analysis in 1988 that presented troubling findings. His calculations showed a benefit-to-cost ratio of just 0.56-meaning for every rupee invested, only 56 paise would be recovered. Paranjpye highlighted that while the dam would submerge around 100 villages in Tehri Garhwal and Uttarkashi districts, no provisions existed for rural electrification in surrounding areas. The generated power would primarily serve industries and urban centres on the plains of Uttar Pradesh, leaving local communities alienated from any benefits.

Project scope and the scale of displacement 🔗

The Tehri Dam’s objectives were multipurpose: generating 1,000 megawatts of hydroelectric power, enabling irrigation across vast agricultural lands, and supplying drinking water to Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, and Uttarakhand. The reservoir created stretches across 52 square kilometres, with a storage capacity capable of irrigating over 270,000 hectares and stabilising irrigation for an additional 600,000 hectares.

However, the human cost was staggering. The historic town of Tehri-the district headquarters for the entire Garhwal region and home to over 20,000 people-lay directly in the submergence zone. Beyond the town, 23 villages faced complete submersion while 72 more would be partially affected. The total displacement figure reached approximately 85,600 to 100,000 people. The reservoir’s 70-kilometre length-40 km up the Bhagirathi valley and 35 km up the Bhilangana-would consume some of the region’s most fertile agricultural land.

Formation of the Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangharsh Samiti 🔗

Local opposition crystallised in 1978 with the formation of the Tehri Bandh Virodhi Sangharsh Samiti (TBVSS), meaning the Anti-Tehri Dam Struggle Committee. Founded under veteran freedom fighter Virendra Datt Saklani’s leadership, the movement drew support across age groups and communities.

When officers and engineers arrived to inaugurate the first diversion tunnel’s construction, thousands of men, women, and children blocked their path. The TBVSS, with active participation from anti-liquor activist Kadambari Devi and environmentalist Sunderlal Bahuguna, collected 10,000 signatures against the dam. Their central argument was profound: the dam jeopardised the constitutional right to life for downstream populations in places like Rishikesh, Haridwar, and beyond. If the dam failed during a major earthquake, a wall of water could devastate cities with combined populations reaching half a million.

Mass protests and Satyagraha 🔗

The TBVSS organised mass protests and Satyagraha involving people from all sections of society. The movement employed Gandhian methods of nonviolent resistance. Locals joined peaceful demonstrations called dharnas-sitting outside construction sites without moving or taking food, sometimes for over a month. In December 2000, hundreds gathered in the submergence area, and in March 2001, activists forced construction to halt for three weeks through a sit-in at the main site.

Legal challenges and the 1991 earthquake 🔗

In 1985, the TBVSS filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court of India (TBVSS v. State of Uttar Pradesh). Their petition argued that the dam, located in a seismically active and tectonically risky area, posed an unacceptable threat. They contended that government authorities had failed to adequately consider safety aspects. The petition was rejected on technical grounds in 1990, with the court noting that expert opinion existed contrary to the petitioners’ submissions.

The Uttarkashi earthquake reignites debate 🔗

Just months after the Supreme Court’s dismissal, nature delivered a stark warning. In October 1991, a 6.8 magnitude earthquake struck the Uttarkashi region, with its epicentre just 53 kilometres from the dam site. Around 2,000 people died, and the districts of Tehri, Uttarkashi, and Chamoli suffered extensive damage. This catastrophe reopened safety debates and energised the opposition movement.

On 14 December 1991, 5,000 people led by Sunderlal Bahuguna brought construction to a complete halt. Bahuguna, who had joined the movement in 1988 and brought Gandhian Satyagraha values to the struggle, undertook a 45-day hunger strike in 1995 that ended only after Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao’s intervention. Later, a 74-day fast at Rajghat, Delhi during H.D. Deve Gowda’s tenure secured a promise of project review-though work eventually resumed in 2001.

Flawed rehabilitation policy and ongoing struggles 🔗

The state’s rehabilitation policy proved deeply problematic. Compensation amounts were inadequate and grossly miscalculated through ad hoc rules that suited policymakers rather than affected families. Land values were consistently undervalued, making it impossible for displaced people to purchase equivalent land elsewhere.

The twelve major lacunae 🔗

The TBVSS documented systematic failures in resettlement. Land allotted as compensation faced problems of denudation and erosion, rendering it far less productive than what families had lost. The definition of “family” requiring immediate rehabilitation was inadequate. Authorities refused to increase earmarked rehabilitation funds. Most damagingly, the policy rehabilitated individual families rather than keeping whole villages intact-tearing apart centuries-old community bonds.

Officials employed divide-and-acquire tactics, creating friction among affected communities. Displaced villagers report that fertile land yielding four crops annually was replaced with unproductive plots. Many families became completely dependent on daily wages, available only 10-15 days per month. The Hanumantha Rao Committee submitted recommendations in 1997, but the government failed to implement most suggestions, particularly those concerning rehabilitation.

Continued legal and civil battles 🔗

Environmental activists N.D. Jayal and Shekhar Singh filed a public interest petition following the 1991 earthquake. The case continued into 2003, when the Supreme Court concluded that construction had not violated environmental clearances, placing responsibility for monitoring future lapses on regulatory agencies. Despite this legal defeat, the struggle for fair rehabilitation continues. Villagers in areas like Malla Uppu still fight for justice, with some receiving inadequate compensation decades after displacement.

The reservoir began filling in 2004, and Sunderlal Bahuguna-who had dedicated his life to opposing the dam-was forcibly evacuated from his home as waters rose. He relocated first to Koti, then to Dehradun, becoming one of the 100,000 people who lost their ancestral homes. Though the dam became operational, questions about seismic safety, fair compensation, and the true costs of development remain unresolved.

What do you think? Does the promise of electricity and irrigation justify displacing over 100,000 people from their ancestral lands? How should governments balance development needs with the rights of communities living in project-affected areas?

References

1. https://www.britannica.com/topic/Tehri-Dam
2. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/004019519390274N
3. https://hindi.indiawaterportal.org/articles/water-crisis-uttarakhand
4. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tehri_Dam
5. https://www.culturalsurvival.org/publications/cultural-survival-quarterly/tehri-dam-india-stumbling-toward-catastrophe
6. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265671816_Passages_from_Nature_to_Nationalism_Sunderlal_Bahuguna_and_Tehri_Dam_Opposition_in_Garhwal
7. https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/indian-villagers-protest-tehri-dam-construction-2001-2002
8. https://repository.uclawsf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1872&context=hastings_international_comparative_law_review
9. https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Regional-seismotectonics-around-the-Tehri-Dam-India-Seismicity-is-from-the-WIHG-Garhwal_fig1_257908484
10. https://india.mongabay.com/2021/05/obituary-sunderlal-bahuguna-end-of-an-era-for-indian-environmentalism/
11. https://indiatogether.org/tehricase-environment
12. https://www.newsclick.in/Uttarakhand-Elections-Villagers-Affected-Tehri-Dam-Still-Await-Justice